Gary J. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Gary J. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake
City : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Roger F. Cutler; Judy F. Lever; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Richard A. Rappaport; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, No. 18333 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3028
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY J. XANTHOS, _ 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18333 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from order of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding 
RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JUDY F. LEVER 
Assistant City Attorney 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellan t 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE o .... o o o o ...... o ...... " .......... c .............. ,. ...... ~ ., 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEALoeoooo•••••••••••••«<'••••••••••••ooeee2 
Ac Official Administrative Action Challenged .... ,.e•~~ .. 3 
B. Facts Relating to Construction of Four 
Duplexes a , " " o ... " ., .. " .... o C' ~. c ( ..... o .. · •. ~ ... <·· ............ "' ..... " " , ........ "' .. 4 
D. Positions of Board and Lower Court C· ........... ,, " ........ 7 
ARGUMENT. • • • • • e • ., • • • • • 0 • 0 • 0 • • ••• e Cl ••• () e • • • • • • • • • • ••••••• ft • e ., • 8 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING AN APPEAL 
FROM A BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DECISION BY DEPART-
ING FROM APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND CONDUCTING 
A TRIAL DE NOVO. RATHER, THE COURT'S JURIS-
DICTION IS LIMITED, UNDER SECTION 10-9~·15 IF UTAH 
CODE ANN., TO DETERMINE: (A) WHETHER THERE 
EXISTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
BOARD'S DECISION, AND (B) WAS THE BOARD'S 
DECISION ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNL/\WPOT..1 ..... Q>., .. " .. ,.. .. "'" ~ .. 8 
A. SECTION 10-9-15 DOES NOT CHANGE THE APPELLATE 
NATURE OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER 
ADMINISTRATIVE ZONING TRIBUNALS NOR THE SCOPE 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW •••••• ec•••••• ••••••••••••••••••• 9 
B.. SECTION 10-9-15 DOES NOT DICTATE A TRIAL DE 
NOVO ON ISSUES OR EVIDENCE, BUT MERELY CLARI-
FIES THE COURT IS NOT CONFINED TO THE FORMAL 
WRITTEN RECORD OF THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ............ ~16 
-i-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C.. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE 
BOARD DECISION A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND 
IN FAILING TO IMPOSE THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
ESTABLISH BOARD ERROR BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EV! DENCE• • e • o • • G • • • • o o o • o • • • • • • • • o • o • • • • • o • • • • o • • • 19 
D.,_ _ THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS ITS DECISION<•••e••••••,••••••24 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS INDEPENDENT FINDING 
THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A VARIANCE UNDER 
SECTION 10-9-12(3) BY MISCONSTRUING THE REQUISITE 
CRITERIA ................................... ~ •••••••••••• 25 
1. Special Conditions •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 26 
2. Unnecessary HardshiP••••••••••••c•••••••••••••••••29 _ 
(a) Economic Hardship Upon the Owner ••••••••••••• 31 
(b) Hardship Upon the Community in 
General •••••••••••• 0••··················••0••33 
(c) Hardship Due to City's Failure to Warn •••• _ ••• 36 
3" Deprivation of Substantial Property Rights ......... 40 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT GRANTING OF 
THE VARIANCE WOULD NOT BE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT 
OF THE ORDINANCE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST; IT 
IGNORED THE RECORD'S SUPPORT FOR THE BOARD'S 
DECISION ........................ ., ........... ·······•·· .. •• .42 
le Parity .......... ., .............. ., ••.• c. ............... 0 •••44 
2o Protection~••••••••••••••• .. ••••••••••••••••••••e••45 
3. Accessibility ........................................ 46 
4. Stabili~ation of Neighborhoods ••.••••••••••••••••• 47 
CONCLUSION ......... • • • • • ., ., ., " • • • · .. · .. c .... • • • • • · • "• • .. • .. • • • • • 0 0 .. • • 49 
-ii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES CITED 
Banks v. City of Bethany, 541 P.2d 178 (Okla., 1975) ••••••••••• 34 
Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Ass'n v-.Board of Permit 
Appeals of City and County of San Francisco , '·. 
59 Cal.Rptr. 146, 427 P.2d 810 (1967) ••••••••••••••.••••• 32, 36 
Cass v. Board of Appeals of:Fall River, 317 N.E.2d 
77, 79 (Mass.Ap.p., 1974) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 35 
Crist v. Mapleton City, 28 U.2d 7, 497 P.2d 633 
( 1972.).· •• •.• •· ~:.-•••• ~ ••••.•••• ·• ••••••••••••••• •· •••••••••••••••••• 14 
City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 
A.2d 508 (Md.App., 1965) •••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••• 14 
City and Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 
626 (Alaska~ 1979) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 29, 41 
~,i ty of Chicago v. Zellers, 64 Ill .App. 2d 24, 
212 N.E.2d 737 (1965) •••••••••••••••••• ~·················39, 40 
Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 8~ Nev~ 250, 43~: 
P. 2d 219 (Nev. -19 6 8 ) .................................... 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 
Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association v. Board 
of Commissioners of Salt Lake Count , 593 P.2d 
1 ( U tah , 19 7 9 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• :. • • • • • • • • • • • .• • :0c. • • • • • • • 1 2 , 1 9 1 2 0 
Cres:_tv.iew-Holladay Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. .: 
Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (µtah, 1976); ••••••••••••••••• 12 
Dansie v. Murray City, 560 P.2d 1123 (UEa~, 1977) •••• : ••••••••• 37 
Denver & Rio Grande We$tern Railroad Co •. v. 
Central Weber Sewer Imerovement D1str1ct, . . . 
4 U.2d 105, 28.7 P.2d 884 (1955) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 17, 19 
Denver-& R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 
98 U. 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 18 
Eason Oil Company v. Uhls, 518 P.2d 50 (Okla., 1974) ....... 14, 20 
Erickson v. City of Portland, 496 P.2d 
726 (Or.App. 1972) •••••••••••••••••• •••·•• •••••• • • • • •• •• • • • • • .41 
-iii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 
663 (1961) ..•.•••••...•••.•••..•...........•....•.... 12, 20, 21 
Hargreaves v. Young, 3 U.2d 175, 280 P.2d 974 
(Utah, 1955) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 46 
Heller v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 171 A.2d 44 
(Pa. 1961) ••••.••.•.....•.......•.•••••••...•.....•.•.•.•.... 44 
In Re Pierce's Appeal, 347 P.2d 790 (Okla., 1959) •••••••••••••• 40 
Ivancovich v. City of Tucson Board of Adjustment, 
22 Ariz.App. 530, 529 P.2d 242 (1974) •••••••••••••••• 14, 20, 32 
Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe County, 
141 Col. 493, 369 P.2d 991 (1962) •••••••••••••••••••••••• 14, 22 
Lovell v. Planning Com'n of the City of Independence, 
37 Or.App. 3, 586 P.2d 99 (1978) ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 29, 34 
Monte Vista Prof. Building v. City of Monte Vista, 
531 P.2d 400 (Colo.App. 1975) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14, 22 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 U.2d 300, 410 
P.2d 764 (1966) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 12, 20, 22 
Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 
( 1959);. reh. den •. 282 N. Y. 681, -26. N. E. 2d 811._._. ••••••••••••• 30 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah, 1976) •••••••••••••••• 16, 17, 19, 20 
Provo City v. Claudin, 91 u. 60, 63 P.2d 570 (_1936) •••••••••••• 14 
Rickard v. Fundenberger, 1 Kan.App.2d 222, 563 
P.2d 1069 (1977) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14, 22, 23 
Siller v. Board of Su rvisors of Cit 
o San Francisco, Ca .Rptr. , P. 
(1962) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14, 20, 22 
Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motors, Inc., Parsons, 
216 Kan. 744, 534 P.2d 1267 (1975) ••••••••••••••••••••••• 29, 32 
Thurman v. City of Mission, 214 Kan. 454, 520 P.2d · 
1 1277 (1974) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •• 4 
-iv-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Topanga Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 113 
Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12 (1974) •••••••••••••••• 34, 36, 41, 45 
Utah Chiropractic Association, Inc. v. Equitable 
Life Insurance Society of the United States, 579 
P.2d 1327 (Utah, 1978) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10 
Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 97 u. 249, 
92_ P.2d 724,,. (1939) ................................... 31, 34, 35, 42 
Whitcomb v. ·city of Woodward, 616. P. 2d 455 
(Okla.App. 1980). ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14, 20, 22 
Williams v. Zonin 
City of Laramie, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12, 20 I 21 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6, 15, 20, 25, 27, 31, 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 33, 35, 36, 40, 44 .. 
Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amende·d •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2, 6, 8-10, 13-16·"· ~·· 
Section 17-27-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended ••••• ; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 5, 2 7 
Rule 65(b), Utah Rules of Civil·Procedure ••••••• 10, 14-16, 11,· 19 
Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 10 
Rule 8l(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure •••••••••••••••••• 10, 15 
Section 7, Article VIII, Utah State Constitution •••••••• 9, 15, 16 
TREATISE 
R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Sections 18.09, 
18.16, 18.30, 18.34 §25.26 (2nd Ed. 1977) •••• 21, 27, 29, 30, 32 
28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sections 79-80, 
pp. 719-7 2 2 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 7 
-v-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 C. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
(3rd Ed. 1972) §45.3 at 45-8 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 41 
Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power - Constructive 
in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 Md.L.Rev. 3 
(1969) •••..•••••••••...••.••••..••••..•..•.•••.•..•.••.••••.• 44 
BA McQuillan, Municipal Corporations §25.334 at 
p. 472 •• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••• 11 
Yockley, Zoning Law and Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol 1, 
at p. 479 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••• 22 
-vi-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiff' and 
Responden,t, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 18333 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
NATURE OF'. THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final,--judgment overruling the Salt 
Lake City Board of Adjustment's refusal to grant Plaintiff-
Respondeht-Xanthos, 1 hereinafter "Respondent" 1 a. zoning variance. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court: admitted certain evidence not presented to 
the Board of Adjustment and conduc,ted the appeal as a de novo 
trial, in effect de:ny·ing the Boa>rd 's Motion iri Lirnini. It 
assumed the prerogative of :independently reweighing and balancing --
interests. The court, also, verbalized its position ·that it had 
authority to substitute its judgment for the Board ·of Adjustment. 
Based upon the Court's new independent findings and conclu-
sions, judgment was entered that Respondent was entitled to a 
variance from the Board.- -This ruling·· ·legalized a structure, 
believed originally to ha·ve been built as a garage, and- permitted 
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• 
its continued use as B single-family dwelling. The Lower Court 
ordered the Board to grant the variance and reimburse the 
Respondent his costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Board, on behalf of itself in this case and for 
the benefit of all municipal boards of adjustment throughout this 
State, seeks a reversal of the Lower Court. Specifically, it 
seeks rulings from this Court: 
1. Ruling that judicial review of Boards of Adjustment 
under Section 10-9-15, U.C.A., 1953, is under the court's consti-
tutional and statutory appellate jurisdiction and does not 
authorize a trial de novo on the merits. 
2. Overturning the Lower Court's judgment by holding it 
erred as a matter of law, by: (a) failing to limit its scope of_ 
review to determine if Board's decision was supported _by credible 
evidence; (b) failing to give Board's findings and decision a 
presumption of validity and impose the burden of proof to es tab-
lish error by clear and convincing evidence; (c) substituting its 
own philosophy and judgment for the Board's; and (d) granting a 
judicial variance because of economic hardship, when that vari-
ance grants the site a privilege no other property or owner in 
the City enjoys as a matter of right and when the effect is con-
trary to the spirit of zoning ordinances and public interest. 
3. Affirming the Board's decision as being adequately 
supported by the credible evidence, even though reasonable per-
-2-
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sons might differ on the dispute 's resolution. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Official Administrative Action Challenged. 
1. Respondent, Gary J. Xanthos, submitted a formal request 
to the Board of, Adjustment for a. zoning variance on February 1, 
1979 in Board Case No. 7928. ~he variance requested legalization 
of the use of an old structure in the northwest corner of the 
Xanthos property as a single-family dwelling. (R-10, 166, .168) 
2. When the structure in question is used as a dwelling 
unit (on the same site where eight new units were constructed by 
Res pond en t 's fa th er) , it lacks: frontage upon a dedicated street; 
, required front, rear and side yards; minimum square footage for 
the design; and miscellaneous compliance .. with City zoning laws 
···applicable tQ: the site, such as parking ,''·'light and open space,~ .. 
identific,a~tion, access to emergency service, :and the ability. :to:. 
stand as an independent building siteJC etc. (R-255-56, 259, 311-. 
12 I 3 21 I 3 3 0-31 I 3 4 6 , 3.S-0 ~ Sl I 3 9 4-9 7 I 4 0 8 I 418 ) • 
. 3. Had;. the desired variance been< granted· by the Board, it 
would have legalized the continued independent use of a small 
- ·structure as a dwelling, which was probably illegally converted 
from a garage and·· is now located beh&nd ~a series of four 
duplexes. (See, Exs •. 13D and 2ln,· Part 2, in App.Ex.1 & 2) 
4. Respondent justified his request for a variance on the 
grounds that the use of the structure as a dwelling was non-con-
forming and/or.that it existed in 197,4 when James Xanthos applied 
-3-
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for and received approval to construct the duplexes, without any 
requirement of record to remove the structure. Thus, he argued 
that strict enforcement by the City some four years later, 
created an unfair and unnecessary hardship. (R-11). 
5. Respondent's request was initially considered before the 
Board at public hearing conducted February 26, 1979. At this 
time, he was represented .by counsel, Mr. Rappaport. The minutes 
contained in the Board's Findings and Order reflect the Board was 
given background information and counsel presented his client's 
case. Neighbors, Mr. Xanthos and others offered testimony on 
various aspects of the case. (R-12-3; 37-8; App.Ex.3) 
6. After considering the testimony and evidence presented 
the Board concluded the variance was not justified. It ruled 
that while the violation of using the structure as a dwelling 
unit should have =been_cdiscovered =andc-conformLty-required~at_:_ the~­
time of -approval or during the construction of-~the duplexes, the 
structure can remain and comply with applicable ordinances if it 
is not used as a dwelling- (App.Ex.3). 
B. Facts Rel a ting to Construction of Four Duplexes. 
7. In 1974, James Xanthos's agent applied for and received 
a permit to construct four single story duplexes, with detached 
parking on 32,195 square feet of land. The application, plot 
plan and building plans were submitted to the City. The City 
relied on said matters in granting the permit. The application 
affirmatively stated that the land was presently "vacant" and 
-4-
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without any dwelling units thereon. The plat plan showed an 
"existing building", but made no reference to it being a dwelling 
unit. The City approved the duplexes' building permit based on 
the assumption that the structure in controversy was not going to 
be used as a dwelling •.. {R-224A-226; 232, .235-6, 256, App.Ex. 1&2) 
8. Bad the· plan.·been considered as ·.one to accommodate nine 
uni ts, it would have violated several applicable zoning .ordi-
nances, including:. lack of frontage on a dedicated street; inade-
quate lot and. yard areas; parking; and the ability of each build-
ing-site to stand alone to independently comply with ordi'."'9 
nances. ( R-2 27, 2 55-6, 29 6-7) • 
9. Nei the·r the City's nor the,,.owner 's approved set of plans 
could··be·located for verification_.Qr notation··of conditions. 
( R-1 4 2, ,~~ 19-2 0, 2 5 4 ) • ,. . 
1 O. James Xanthos.,.proceeded·:.wi th construction-of ,the- .four ---
dupl.e~es during the period of 1974-75; and inspections were made·:;: 
·~k by City building and,'specialty inspectors. (R-221~4) •. After a 
request. for a certificate of occupancy .. ("C.O."). in April of 1975, 
final inspections were completed. (.R-23.3),. 
11. Respondent's copy of the. "c.o. 's", bears no. notations of 
written conditions;. although, the building inspector of, at least 
one unit, Marvin Peguillan, testified that as a very new inspec-
tor, he inquired of his supervisor Mark Lawson, about the rear 
building. .ffe was informed t.the old' building was going .to obe torn 
down. (R-388) Consequently, he signed off for the finaLd.nspec-
-5-
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tion on September 30, 1975, but made no notation on the C.O. of 
the uncompleted condition of removal of the structure. (R-384-90) · 
12. The Board noted that the violations of the structure's 
use as a dwelling should have been caught or resolved during con-
struction. However, it did not find that the inaccurate applica-, 
tion, misleading plans or ineffective resolution of zoning viola-
tions during construction constituted "special circumstances" 
which attached to the property under Section 10-19-12(3) (a) 
U.C.A. It did find that the loss of rental income was not a hard-
ship justifying a variance. (App.Ex.3, R-38; copies of Sections 
10-9-12 and 10-9-15, U.C.A., 1953 are reproduced as App.Ex.4). 
13. The Lower Court disregarded the Board's finding and 
rationale. In its Amended Findings of Fact, the Court reviewed 
these facts, but infers a duty upon the City to detect and 
resolve ::_~zoning ·"violations· during "Plan-_review_or_ construction. 
Failing that duty,--.the Court.held-the City creates:-"special cir~ 
cumstances" entitling the property owner to a variance, legaliz-
ing zoning violations. (Paras. 15-19, 21, App.Ex.5; R-111-13). 
c. History of the Site. 
14. Use of the then old-appearing structure as a dwelling 
was documented back to 1942, some 15 years after City zoning was 
adopted in 1927. (R-203, 215, App~Ex.5; R-111) 
15. The Lower Court then found that the usage in 1942 and 
the age of the structure were special circumstances justifying 
the variance. ( R-113) 
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16. The structure has never been an independent residence, 
according to records on file in the City. (R-231; Ex's 210, 280, 
290 and 300; cf. R-155, 252, 211). It was and is not visible the 
Street; has no mailing address, identification or access from a 
public road; and had been remodeled, without permits since the 
Xanthos family acquired· it in 1972. Further, the only primary 
structures approved by the City for the ·site, for which water and 
sewer services were authorized prior. to construction of the four 
duplexes, were removed by.James Xanthos, his.family and others 
without permit. ( R-182, 207, 21 l, .321, 363-4, 369, 377 and Ex. 
210 part 1, 28D and 290) In addition, Xanthos contributed to the 
confusion by deviating-from the official addresses which had been 
assigned to the.;duplexes. (R-318-9; 337-8) 
O.· Posit ions of·' Board and Lower Court 
· 17..... The Board found,, among other- things tha .. t: ( 1) The 
builder represented· that all h~. expected· t9 have on the site, 
after the· construction;. was'. eight units;. ·-(2) The ordinances would 
not allow, anywhere in the City, dwellings to.be constructed in 
front "of others, as a matter of right; and ( 3) The gr an ting of 
the desired variance would legalize and ensure the continuation 
of a dwelling that does not have the required street access, 
iden tif ica tion'., yard areas, landscaping, open space and other . 
amenities the ordinances are intended to require and provide. 
· 18. The Board, in exercising its statutory duty to balance 
the spirit and intent of the ordinances a9ainst the effect and 
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the ability to comply, found the variance unjustified. (R-13, 
382-8, App.Ex.3). 
19. In its review of the case, the Lower Court disregarded 
the Board's reasoning and substituted its own. It assumed the 
respc)nsibility and prerogative to independently balance the pub-
lie interest, represented by compliance with City law, as opposed 
to the landowners private interests or benefits served by grant-
ing a variance. (R-345-6; 355-9). The Lower Court held: 
"5. Plenary action relief constitutes a complete 
review of the Board of Adjustment's decision by trial 
de novo and the Court has the same power as the Board 
of Adjustment to review the facts." (R-113; App.Ex.5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING AN APPEAL 
FROM A BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DECISION BY DEPART-
: ING FROM.APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND CONDUCTING 
A TRIAL DE NOVO. RATHER, THE COURT'S JURIS-
DICTION·Is-LiMTTED/ UNDER -SECTION 10-9-15 ·uTA1t 
CODE ANN., TO DETERMINE: (A) WHETHER THER-E~­
EXISTED CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ·To SUPPORT THE 
BOARD'S DECISION, . AND ( B) WAS THE BOARD'S 
DECISION. ·ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR UNLAWFUL. 
The Lower Court denied a Motion in Limini and declined to 
limit its scope of review and evidence in an appeal under Section 
· l0-9..;..l5 of ·a· city Board of Adjustment zoning decision. It 
assumed the prerogative to independently retry, reweigh and 
balance interests. It candidly stated of its judicial role in 
such a case as follows: 
"5. Plenary action relief constitutes a complete 
review of the Board of Adjustment's decision by 
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trial de novo and the Court has the same power as 
the Board of Adjustments to review the facts." 
See Facts 5, App.Ex.5, R-113. 
Said conclusion reflects the court's· erroneous decisions 
that: (1) The scope of review was not appellate, but rather de 
novo in nature and ·not a trial limited to0.;a review of the issues 
or evidenc·e presented to the Board; ( 2) There is no presumption 
of validity to zoning administrative deci:s·ions; and ( 3) ·A ·Utah. 
District Court is free to substitute 'its judgment for ·that of the 
zoning Board of Adjustment, even where reasonable parties might 
differ over the·' reasonableness of .. .the, ·original decision. 
A. SECTION 10-9~15 DOES' NOT·:CH.ANGE THE APPELLATE 
NATURE OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRA-
TIVE ZONING TRIBUNALS NOR THE SCOPE OF JUDI.CI-AL 
REVIEW. 
Courts are given two types of jurisdiction under··Section 7, 
.~rticle VIII, c:>f the Utah State Constitution. Here they are 
given· appe-1-late -jur isdi-ction ·and supervisory ·control over all 
inferior courts and tribunals •. This.provision recognizes that 
the courts may need to utilize the common law equitable writs to 
perform this '(.lppellate responsibility. Such writs, particularly 
.- , . .J:l' 
certiorari, were traditionally used to invoke the judiciary' s 
limited appellate review-to challenges of abuse of discretionary 
powers given to inferior statutory. bodies, where statutes do not 
expressly provide a remedy for judicial review. 
However, in our case a statute does exist which reads: 
"Judicial review of board's decision -- Time limita-. 
tion. The city or any person aggrieved by any decision 
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of the board of adjustment may have and maintain a 
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such 
relief is presented to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion within thirty days after the filing of such deci-
sion in the office of the board." 10-9-15 Utah Code 
!.!!.!!. • ' 19 53. 
This statute has three purposes: (1) Require the petition for 
judicial appellate review be filed timely, as a 30 day statute of 
limitation; (2) Fix as an ascertainable event to trigger the 
commencement of the limitation period, the date of filing the 
decision in the board's office; and (3) Clarify that the review-
ing court is not confined to the certified record to review the 
action, but all evidence presented to the Board as shall be more 
fully discussed below in Point B. 
These functions were not provided under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereinafter "U.R.C.P.", dealing with extraordi-
nary writs. 1 'Rather, prior --to-1972 ·and the-adoption -of Rule 
8l(d), u.R.C.P., if the legislature had desired to fix a pre-
dictable short statute of limitation, it would have had to pass 
such a statute. 2 Thus, City submits that the purpose of Section 
10-9-15 U.C.A. was to supplement the common law certiorari 
process of invoking appellate review under Rule 65(b), by estab-
1Rule 65(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2utah Chiro ractic Association, Inc. v. E uitable Life Insurance 
Society o t e Unite States, 7 P. (Uta exp ains 
Rule 8l(d) adopted in January 20, 1972 combine with Rule 73 to 
require administrative appeals to be filed within one month. 
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lishing a predictable statute of limitation and allowing evi-
dentiary proof of matters presented to the Board. It was not to 
confer a new source of o.riginal jurisdiction to the trial courts. 
The respected treatise on municipal law succintly summarizes 
the ~aw concer'ning the -scope of, -ap:Pella te j.udicial review of 
zoning boards, including boards with power to grant variances as 
follows: 
."In other words, the scope of judicial review and 
inquiry is limited to whether the determination of th-e 
zonin board is unreasonable, arbitrar or an abuse of 
discretion on the acts or 1s an illegal error. And 
the reviewing court is required to consider the evi-
dence most favorable to the decision of the ·zo.ning 
authori~ies." 8A McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 
§25.334 at p. 472 (Emphasis added). 
Utah courts have not expressly addressed the issue on cases· 
arising under a board of adjustment;, however, this court has 
applied ;this same ~tandard of limited appellate review in other 
zon-ing matters; which Appellant submits should be dispositive. A 
concise summary of the.general rules applicable in review of 
zoning cases has'· been rendered by this Co\lrt1 ·in the 1·979. Here, 
a 6halienge was brciught 6~ a citi~en ·group cont~sting the 
administrative act of the Co.un"ty in issuing ·a· special/ 'conditional 
use permit to allow.construction of a large apartment complex 
after modification 6f a plan earlier rejected~ Before addressing 
specific factual issues, this Court states the· ·ruies· for -judicial 
review of zoning decisions a~ follo~s: 
•tn \;:~ddressing the plaintiff's' attack upon the judg-
ment, there are certain rules to be considered. Due to 
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the complexity of factors involved in the matter of 
zoning, as in other fields where the courts review the 
actions of administrative bodies, it should be assumed 
that those charged wi.th that respons1b1l1ty (the Com-
mission) have specialized knowledge in that field. 
Accordingly they should be allowed a comparatively wide 
latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed with 
a presumption of correctness and validit~ which the 
courts should not interfere wtih-unless 1t is shown 
that there is no reasonable basis to Justify the action 
taken." Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass 1n v. Bd. of 
Comm. of S.L.Co., 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah, 1979). 
By so doing, the court has clearly extended to zoning admin-
istrative cases the general rules of limited appellate review. 
See also, Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 
(1961) (denial of rezoning to commercial); Naylor v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 17 U.2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966) (rezoning from "R-6" 
to "B-3"), Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Engh 
Floral Corp., 545 P. 2d 1150 (Utah 1976) (rezoning from ag_r icul-
--~ .: ___ - · - · ture-res idential to commercial). 
In a case-·where issues are,-virtual-ly- identical--to_.the _one __ =-
before the bar, our sister State Wyoming has ruled specifically 
"-·-·that·-Board of -Adjustment deeisions are presumptively. valid- andc 
subject of only limited judicial review •. The Wyoming court held 
that the existence of a statutory remedy or "appeal" does not 
- ch·ange the· 1imlted scope of appellate review otherwise-available 
by extraordinary writs in board of adjustment litigation. 
Williams v. Zoning Adjustment Board of the City of Laramie, 383 
P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1963). 
In the Willilams case, a Board granted a variance·· to permit 
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the rebuilding and enlarging of a nonconforming building, which 
decision was contested. One of the issues was the scope and 
procedure for such reviews. The plaintiff argued the court 
should conduct a "trial de novo" where the court would rehear all 
the·. evidence and redecide :the cas.e, on the merits, even though _. __ the 
statutory remedy did not specifically mention a trial de novo.3 
Judge Mcintyre noted that the powers of the court, upon 
review under a statute were of the same effect as those under the 
extraordinary writ process. He rejected the plaintiffs' argument 
that an "appeal" made any substantive difference in the scope of 
review and explained the distinction between the process of 
invokintj judicial jurisdiction over an administrative action as 
opposed to the type. of jurisdiction - be it original or appel-
·• ~ 
late • 
. "In these quotations the term 'ap;Peal·.•_, as used in . 
~statutes similar to §15-626, was characterized as only~·· 
a means of ettin the coh:.trovers before a courtj not 
as an a eal in t e sense o a trans er o ur1sdiction 
rom ·one. court to .anot er, ut simp y a erocess, under 
,.the mislead~ng name of appeal, for invoking the judi-
cial· power to. determine a legal injury complained of; 
as a mode of removin the cause from an administrative 
to a Judicial tr1 unal, when it 1s claimed a legal 
r i ht has been denied; and as an or i ina1· a ·. 1 ica tion 
to a court to exercise its .ud1c1a ower in res ect 
to y t e adm1n1strat1ve tr1buna 1n 
"We find nothing in the: opinion·:of Judge Riner which 
would suggest that the trial in district court, on 
appeal from an adjustment ·board, should be a trial de 
3section 10-9-15 similarly does not-mention trial de~· 
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novo. On the contrary, it seems clear to us the deci-
sion in the Mcinerney case contemplated as the statute 
does, that the court has only the duty to review for 
the· purpose of determining whether the acts done by the 
administrative tribunal were in excess of its ;power, or 
in the unlawful abuse of that power. In the event the 
action complained of should be found to be arbitrary, 
or illegally exercised, then and only then would the 
court vacate, reverse, correct or modify." Id. at 732 
(Emphasis added). 
This case is directly on point and supported by board of adjust-
ment cases from other jurisdict~ons. 4 
The existence of Section 10-9-15 could arguably remove a 
request for judicial review out of the scope of Rule 65(b)(2). 5 
4For other cases from other jurisdictions supporting the limited 
appellate scope of judicial review to board of adjustment 
decisions see City of Baltimore v. Borinsk:(, 239 Md. 611, 212 
A.2d 508 (Md.App. 1965) (denial of use variance to build office 
in residential zone); Siller v. Board of Supervisors of City and 
County of San Francisco, 25 Cal. Rptr. 73, 375 P.2d 41 (1962) 
(challenge to Planning Commission's grant of variance to reduce 
off street-parking); Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe 
County r~l41.,,,,Gol. ~ 493,- -369:c' 7P. 2d~'c991-,,..-C1962+~-(denial---Of--variance to_~= 
reduce acreage per lot); Eason Oil Company v. Uhls, 518 P.2d 50 
(Okla., 1974) (denial -of ·use variances-to permit 0 oil drilling in 
nondrilling areas); Monte Vista Prof.· Bldg. v. City of Monte, 
Vista, 531 P.2d 400 (Colo. App. 1975) (contesting condition& of 
variance granted); Whitcomb v. City of Woodward,.616 P.2d 455 
(Okl.App., 1980) (denial of use variance); Rickard v. 
Fundenberger, 1 Kan.App.2d 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977) (contesting 
interpretation of Board refusing to revoke accessory building 
permit); Ivancovich v. City of Tucson Board of Adjustment, 22 
Ariz.App. 530, 529 P.2d 242 (1974) (granting of height variance). 
5utah cases are not helpful. The only cases noted under 10-9-15 
do not address the issue of what type of procedure is 
appropriate, for in both cases the protesting property owners 
failed to bring suit against the boards of adjustment • In Provo 
City v. Claudin, 91 U 60, 63 P.2d 570, failed to challenge an 
interpretation of "funeral home" to the Board as authorized, 
choosing .rather to :..sue .the .City : .. Commission ignoring an 
admin.istrative appeal of the -interpretation; and Crist v. 
Mapleton City, 28 U.2d 7, 497 P.2d 633 (1972) where the board 
(footnote continued) 
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However, even under such an interpretation it does not follow 
that its existence dictates changes of the substantive rights, 
scope of review or presumptions traditionally afforded under 
constitutional appellate review6 of administrative zoning board 
decisions, whether the remedy be denoted "review", "certiorari", 
"appeal" or 11 action". 
For example, it should be noted that Title 10 only applies 
to cities and to so hold grants an aggrieved party who owns land 
in unincorporated. areas of the county (who is denied a variance 
by a county Board of Adjustment under Section 17-27-16)7 a dif-
ferent substantive right for invoking the Court's limited appel-
late jurisdiction. This fact is true because judicial review of 
county Boards of Adjustment are by extraordinary writ of certior-
ari. .Appellant submits such result would make reason stare. 
··,It is resp~ctfully submitted that Section ~:10-9-15 U .c .A. 
- should be read 'i_n conjunction with Rules 81 (d) and 65 (bl (2) '·of 
5ruled .. on a contested interpretation over whether plaintiff• s 
'.ope·ration was a "°s<::?hool u authorized in residen.tial di.etricts. 
However, plaintiff did not sue the board but ignoring Section 10-
9-15 to sue the building official v.ia a. writ of mandamus. The 
court ruled suit against the building.official was improper when 
they -should have sued the Board under Section 10-9-15 .. 
6section 7, Article VIII,· Utah :State Con·stitution ~ 
.
7section 17-27-16, Utah Code Ann. authorized counties to create 
boards of adjustment to perform basically the same functions as 
under the parallel for cities Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Ann, 
However, the statute ·is silent as to limitations or pro-cedures 
for judicial review, which apparently wi11 dictate proceeding 
by Rule 65(b) (2) under Rule 8l(d), U.R,C.P. 
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the U.R.C.P. Utah should continue to follow the other well 
reasoned decisions of this and other states that limit appellate 
review of zoning board decisions to a review of the evidence 
before the administrative board and whether they acted arbi-
trarily, capriciously or illegally. 
B. SECTION 10-9-15 DOES NOT DICTATE A TRIAL DE 
NOVO ON ISSUES OR EVIDENCE, BUT MERELY CLARI-
FIES THE COURT IS NOT CONFINED TO THE FORMAL 
WRITTEN RECORD OF THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. 
Section 10-9-15 is silent as to the type of hearing and 
scope of evidence that is appropriate upon the judicial review of 
the administrative action. However Utah administrative review 
case law provides the answer. 
The 1976 Utah case of Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976) arose out of the 
County Commission's revocation of plaintiff's massage/he_altb_ ·"------
studio license. Plaintiff appealed to district court which held 
her petition for review should be via extraordinary writ; plain-
tiff filed an interlocutory appeal to claim a trial de nova_. 
This Court affirmed, acknowledg_ing the responsibility of the 
district court to exercise its appellate review to conduct its 
constitutional supervisory control over inferior courts and tri-
bunals under Section 7, Article VIII of the Utah State Constitu-
tion. Further, it held with the trial court that the Peatross 
·facts fell under Rule 65(b) and that there was only limited 
appellant review. It states: 
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"The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is 
the authority to review the actions or judgments of an 
inferior tribunal UIX>n the record made in that tri-
bunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or 
judgment." Id. at p. 284 (Emphasis added). 
The court goes on to state that: 
". • • .where the defendant Board has conducted a hear-
· ing that comported wth due process requirements, and 
where there is no express statutory grant of. a trial de 
novo, the plaintiff was mistaken in her insistence that 
she is· entitled to one as a matter of right. However 
we deem it appropriate to observe that notwithstanding 
what we have said herein, the petition for and the 
issuance of an extraordinary writ under Rule 65B is in 
the nature of a proceeding in equity; and we do not 
desire to be understood as foreclosing the proposition 
that the district court in the exercise of its general 
powers as hereinabove pointed out, could take evidence 
if it thought that the· interests of justice so 
"· required." Id. at p. 284 (Emphasis added). 
The c~~rt in Peatross, (purely a: Rule 65(B) action) relied 
upon the earlier 1955 case of Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improvemen.t District, 4 U.2d 10~, 
287 P.2d 884 (1955). This 1955 D&RGW case did not arise under 
Rule 6:.S(B) but under a statute. 8 
Plaintiffs contested they were entitled to a trial de novo, 
while the sewer district urged that only the certified evidence 
and record were reviewable. The court disagreed with both. It 
held a review of the record must be made in~light of due pro-
8ouoting footnote No. 1 at 287 P.2d 836 of the 1955 D&RGW case 
the relevant portion of Section 3, Chapter 32, Laws of Utah, 1951 
provided a remedy for a protesting property owner to "apply for a 
writ of -review of the actions· .of· the board • • • " No: grant of 
trial de novo is mentioned. 
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cess. If the record reveals the board complied with due -process 
and those facts support or negate the decision, the court could 
examine only the record to determine if there has been an abuse 
of discretion. However, if the record is inadequate the court is 
entitled to determine what facts were before the administrative 
tribunal and determine the factual considerations of the board. 
The only case of which the writers --are -aware,- -where a 
statute uses the word "plenary", arose in the earlier 1940 case 
of Denver & R.G.W.R.Co. v. Public Service Commission, 98 U. 431, 
100 P.2d 552 (1940) where the statute authorized a "plenary 
review" which was to "proceed as a trial de nova". This old case 
describes "plenary review" as a "full review, a complete 
review". The court went on to describe, on page 554, that this 
statute's express grant of a trial de novo did not contemplate 
retrial upon new evidence because this is inconsistent with -
appellate review. Rather, it was to be a trial upon the ,record 
made before the administrative body. 
Thus, in this case, where a trial de novo was expressly 
granted, as is not the case before the bar, it was viewed as 
me~ely enlarging the type of evidence to extend beyond the certi-
fied record. It did not enlarge the judicial review to become 
the administrative hearing officer or allow it to consider 
matters not before the original administrative body. 
In summary, Appellant submits that in -absence-of an express 
statutory grant of a trial de ~ the Lower Court erred in 
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establishing itself as the City's Board of Adjustment. Further, 
the "plenary action" language of the statute merely entitles the 
reviewing court to extend beyond the certified record 9 and. to 
accept testimony or evidence to get a more complete record of the 
facts, arguments and considerations which were before the admin-
istrative body decision, as describE?d in D&RGW Co. v. Central 
Weber Sewer Impi:o~ement District, supra~.,_ The evidence of factors 
not considered or presented to the ·Board should not have been 
received in evidence. The retrial of issues and facts, on their 
meritsi··,fby the Lower Court as occurred in this case, will result 
with the Court becomi'ng a super board of. adjus.tment. This result 
is wrong and should be rejected ·by this Court. 
C. THE LOOER COURT ERRED IN FAI.LING TO GIVE THf; 
BOARD DECISION A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND 
IN FAILING .. TO IMPOSE THE :.BURDEN OF PROOF .TO 
ESTABLISH BOARD ERROR BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE. 
The Lower., Court fa.iled. .. to .apply the •. ~universally accepted 
- -~principle for. the judicial re"view. ,of zoning board decisions; that 
is: they are .presumptively -valid and the challenger has the 
burden <of proof .to have them overturned. These rules were 
developed to. preserve the constitutional system _of checks and 
balances and s·eparations of_ powers. This Court enunciated and 
adopted these principles in Cottonwood Heights, supra.. Here this 
9As the court would simi1a.r1y hav.e discretion. to do undE?r 
Peatross in a Rule 65(b) action. 
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• 
court recognized that: (1) Where boards are dealing with matters 
charged to their responsibility, it is assumed those boards have 
specialized experience or expertise in the area, and they are to 
be afforded a wide latitude in exercising their discretionary 
judgments; (2) The Board's actions are endowed with a presump-
tion of validity; and (3) The challenger must prove an abuse of 
discretion or illegal actions by the zoning board by clear and 
convincing evidence. See also, Peatross v. Board of Commis-
sioners of Salt Lake County, supra and Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 
supra; Ga~land v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra, for other zoning 
cases where the general principle is sustained. 
These principles are necessary to allow boards to fulfill 
their statutory responsibilities and powers involving discretion-
ary judgments; for example, here under Section 10-9-12 to deter-
mine spirit and intent of City zoning ordinances, impacts of 
variances, etc.). In the Williams case, -supra, Judge Mcintyre 
recognized that zoning variances involve -such discretionary judg-
ment and indicates: 
• "That however, is a matter of opinion which in 
this instance was addressed to the sound discretion of 
the adjustm~_i1t_board. As lon<J as our state statute 
authorizes exce fions and variances to be made, we 
cannot if we would erevent them from eing made, unless 
the board 1s discretion is abused." 383 P.2d at 733 
(Emphasis added). 
This rule supports its underlying purpose to preserve the separa-
tion of powers and permit bodies with special expertise to func-
tion, without undue judicial interference. In short, the burden 
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is on the challenger to prove Board abuse of discretion or 
illegality; he correctly summarizes: 
"In keeping. with the general rule that, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, public officers will be 
presumed to, have properly pe . .rformed their duties and 
not to have acted il1-egally, de_cisions of -zoning boards 
·\'..-i .. ~~ of adjustment as to exceptionsdand variations are 
.regarded as presumptively fair, reasonable and correct; 
and the burden is upon those complaining thereof to 
show the board acted impropet6Y." ( ci ta tio.ns omitted, 
Id. at 733, emphasis added). . 
The standard of judicial restraint to preve.nt inappropr.iate 
judicial':interference with the administration of local zoning, 
has also been clearly stated ~y this_ Court; in Cottonwood 
Heights, this Court observed: 
-r·· ..,, .. 
"* * * and their action [administrative special use 
permit] endowed with a presumption of validity which 
the court should not interfere with unless.;. it -is shown 
that there is no reasonable basis t:o Justify the action 
taken.::H 593 -P.2d at p~ DIO (Emphashs ·added)'. · ·-:~-
'··~· .... 
It is' for ,:~the"'~challenger of a:·Board of Adjustment's ... action to: 
bear. the bur.den ta'. show the decision i-s arb.i_trary and capri ... _ 
cious~ 11 The: -court. .mus·t not invade and substitute.r its. ju.dgment 
unless it is shown .by ... clear (and- convinc~ng )'": e·rror or .... ~~ow~ng _ 
·"that· there is· no reasonable-· basis wha~soeyer to ju~!tify it and.: 
its actions must therefore be regard~g as capricious and arbi-
10see also ·Ivancovich v. City of Tucson, supra; Whitcomb v. City 
of Woodward, supra, Eason Oil Co. v. Uhls, supra, Siller v. Board 
of Supervisors of the City & ~ounty of ~.~r.1 F·~-~ncisco, supra;. 
11Gay-land·v. Salt Lake County, supra; 4 R. Andersc>n, American Law 
of Zoning, §25.26, p. 263 (2nd Ed, l977). 
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trary. n 12 
Since the law requires •no reasonable basis to justify the 
action," before a judicial reversal may be made, a situation 
where reasonable parties might differ obviously does not present 
facts sufficient to justify the Court substituting its judgment 
for that of the Board of Adjustment. The self-restraint required 
of the reviewing court has been explained-in Yackley, Zoning Law 
and Practice, Second Edition, Vol. 1 at p. 4 79, quoted in the 
Colorado Levy case, supra. It noted: 
"It is a well settled proposition of zoning law that a 
court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment 
of the board. The court may not feel that the decision 
of the board was the best that could have been rendered 
under the circumstances. It may thoroughly disagree 
with the reasoning by which the board reached its deci-
sion. It may feel that the decision of the board was a 
substandard piece of logic and thinking. Nonetheless, 
the court will not set aside the board's view of the 
"matter.- ~us-t -to--in3ect~-.i-ts_,own ideas into_ the picture of_ 
things\1 369 ,p.2d -994,-+Ernph-asis added). 
To the-same effect is the-Kansas case of. Rickard v. 
Fundenberger, supra. Here, the court held the trial court 
exceeded permissible review when it substituted its judgment for 
a Board who refused to cancel a building permit for an accessory 
building and proceeded to reduce its size. Similar to the case 
before the bar, that Kansas Lower Court judge stated he believed 
12Naylor v. Salt Lake Cit~ Corp.,_supra at p. 766. See also 
Siller v. Board of Su ervisors of cit & Count of San Francisco, 
supra, at p. ; Monte Vista Pro essiona B ~·, Inc. v. City of 
Montec--Vista,--"supra at p. -402-3; -Whi-tcornb"V. City of Woodward, 
supra, at p. 456; Rickard v. Fundenberger, supra at p. 1072. 
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he had a large measure of discretion in such cases. l3 correctly, 
he was reversed by the Kansas Supreme Court. 
In the case now before '.this Court. the district court's 
finding and statements. on the record clearly reflect (because of 
-construing the: heari_Qg. as a "de novo','. ··trial)· that it felt no 
obligation of"~~judicial restraint. Tt felt free to and did sub-
stitute its judgment for the Board's. _In doing so, the Lower 
Court ignored the facts before the Board demonstrating the 
reasonable basis for the Board' S· ·decision, improperly shifted the 
burden of· pro·of and exceeded· its authority. Thus, the Lower 
.c:: 
Court should be reversed. 
The facts of the condition of the site, as they were 
presented to the Board, were not in substantial disagreement, 
although there was some confu.sion about the past history. 14 ·They 
demonstrated tna t .xanthos was seeking· to -legalize the existence 
of a dwelling unit which basically was an illegally-converted 
garage behind a duplex. To comply with ordinances, it would 
require that the structure not be used as a dw~lling; thus it 
either must be-removed or used as .a shed or·some accessory use. 
Its negative impact on Xanthos was the loss of ·a rental unit 
and the income it produced. The benefits to the City of the 
13Rickard v. Fundenberger, supra at p. 1072. Compare with Judge 
Rigtrup statements and findings. (R-113, 137-40, .and 346). 
14see Statements of Facts, part C. ·· 
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variance denial were that it would bring the site into zoning 
compliance. It would not legalize or encourage the continued use 
of a dwelling considered substandard in material ways including: 
the lack of frontage on a dedicated street; inadequat:,e front, 
rear and side yards; the absence of necessary square footage for 
a place of human habitation; -and other related impacts. 15 In 
short, a variance would materially have interferred with the goal 
of bringing the site into zoning compliance and enhancing the 
secondary area and neighborhood. 
D. THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS ITS DECISION 
It appears from the record, already cited in the Statement 
of Facts, that the court disagreed with the Board, basically, 
because of the economic impact on Respondent and because of the 
~ -less of--one dwe-11.ing unit- in-- t.he_ City. Th_e Lower_ Cou~r~t _view~d ____ _ 
the impact of its continued use as a dwelling only -from tangible 
results of its removal; it gave less weigh t~than the Board did to 
-- ---'-"_,-the -goals· -and- purposes ' 0 that:----zc:min<}'--Ordinances are a-ttempting _to_ 
achieve. 16 
Appellant submits there is more than reasonable support for 
the Board's decision. The Lower Court, based on its prejud-ices-
and judgment, simply disagreed with the priorities of the 
l 5statement of Facts,~paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 14 and 15. 
16statement of Facts, pages 2-4, 6, 8, 11-12, 14-15 and 17. 
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Board. Thus, in error it felt free to substitute its judgment. 
Consequently, as a matter of law, the trial court' decision 
should be reversed and the board's decision affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS INDEPENDENT 
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A 
VARIANCE UNDER SECTION 10-9-12(3) BY MISCON-
STRUING THE REQUISITE CRITERIA. 
The Lower Court seriously misconstrued Section 10-9-12(3), 
Utah Code Ann., 1953. A proper reading of that section would 
have resulted in the court's denial of the requested variance, 
regardless of the scope of review. Section 10-9-12(3) states: 
"The board of adjustment shall have the following powers: 
" ( 3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms 
of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public 
interest, where owing to special conditions a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result 
in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the 
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. 
Before any variance may be authorized, however, it shall be 
shown that: 
"(a) The variance will not substantially affect the 
comprehensive plan of zoning in the city and that 
adherence to the strict letter of the. ordinance will 
cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of 
which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to 
carry out the general purpose of the plan. 
"(b) Special circumstances attached to the property 
covered by the application which do not generally apply 
to the other property in the same district. 
"(c) That because of said special circumstances, 
property covered by application is deprived of privi-
leges possessed by other properties in the same dis-
trict; ;and that the granting of !the variance is essen-
tial to the enjoyment of a subs tan ti al property right 
possessed by other property in the same district. 
(Emphasis added) 
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At a minimum, the statute requires that the applicant 
show: (1) special conditions attached to the property; (2) 
unnecessary hardship; and (3) the deprivation of substantial 
property rights. Then the Board must use its discretion to weigh 
such factors against the spirit of the ordinance. The Respondent 
has failed on every count to satisfy the required showings. 
1. Special Conditions. 
The reviewing court found that the following special circum-
stances existed: 
"There are special circumstances attached to the 
property covered by the application whi~~ do not 
generally apply to other properties in the same 
district including, but not limited to: (a) the age 
and occupancy of the dwelling; (b) the approval by the 
City of the development of the duplexes the issuance of 
certificates of occupancy for the duplexes (sic); and 
(c) the failure of the City to inform James Xanthos 
that the dwelling would not comply with zoning ordi-
nances -thereby failing to give him the opportunity to 
redesign the layout for the duplexes in such a way as 
not to require the demolition of the-dwelling." 
Amended Finding of Fact i21, App.Ex.5. 
Assuming that the facts cited in (a)-(c) are supported by the 
evidence, the enumerated special circumstances are not the type 
contemplated by the statute. 
First, the language of subsection 3(b) states the "special 
circumstances" to be considered by the board are those that are 
"attached to the property covered by the application". A compar-
ison of the parallel code section governing county boards of 
adjustment makes it more explicit. It states: 
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" • • Upon appeals the Board of Adjustment shall have 
the following powers: ••• (3) Where bt reason of 
exceetional narrowness, shallowness or s ape of a 
specific piece of property at the time of the enactment 
of the re~ulation, or by reason of exceptional toeogra-
phic conditions or other extraordinary and exceptional 
situation or condition of such piece of·· property, the 
strict application of any regulation enacted under this 
act would result. i~ .. peculiar and exceptional practical 
. difficulties to, ot exceptional and undue hardshfps 
upon, the owner of: such property, to au th or ize, upon an 
appeal relating to said property, a variance from such 
strict application so as to relieve such difficulties 
or hardship, provided such relief may be granted with-
out substantial detriment to the public good and with-
out substantially impairing the intent and purpose of 
the zone plan and zoning resolutions." §l 7-·27-16, 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended (Emphasis added). 
The specificity of this statute drives home the point that the 
"special circumstances" to be considered in the variance process 
_are those that are basically topographic in nature. Furthermore, 
these topographical conditions must be unique to the subject 
property; those conditions that affect an entire district are not 
sufficient to grant a variance: 
"The requirement of unique circumstances is not met 
simply by pointing out differences between the appli-
cant's land and. the land of other owners. It is not 
enough that, in fact and in law,~ each par·cel; of .l.and is 
unique. The unique circumstances which must be e~tab­
lished are those 'related to the hardship· complained., 
of •.. If singu.l_ar and related, topoEraphical, features are 
lacking, the· ·court ma·~ not find t at the circumstances. ·, 
which plague the applicant are different from those 
which af feet the la·na · of ·his- nejAhbors." . -Anderson,· .. · 
American Law of Zoning 2d Ed. Sl .34 and cases cited 
therein. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the type of special condition contemplated by· §10-9-
12(3) is that which applies· directly to ·the land in question. 
The most diligent search of the record will not reveal one shred 
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of evidence concerning this type of special circumstance. 
Indeed, the court's Finding No. 21 evidences little regard ___ for 
circumstances that attach to the land, but instead places great 
emphasis on the failure of the City to detect and resolve viola-
. tions during construction. Cursory examination of the enumerated 
"special circumstances" will show that they do not qualify as 
special conditions. 
As to the Lower Court's finding about "the age and occupancy 
of the dwelling", a building may be old and have a history of 
illegal occupancy. That fact may or may not make it unique in 
the zoning district; but, it tells us nothing about specific 
topographical features relating to the property which distinguish 
it from other properties in the same district. If a variance can 
be sustained simply because of the existence of an old building 
on a lot, the goal of bringing non-conforming buildings into 
compliance would be thwarted; zoning would soon be by variance, 
rather than ordinance. Pointing out that an old building is on 
the lot merely recognizes that no two parcels ·are e~actly 
alike. In this 'broad sense, every parcel has unique characteris-
tics and could qualify for special treatment; and this absurd 
result demands a stricter interpretation of the requirement. 
The court's other special circumstances "(b)" and "(c)" are, 
likewise, manifestly unrelated to the property in question. They 
obviously relate only to the relationship between the Respondent 
and the City zoning officials. 
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The court's findings imply that differences between individ-
ual owners of parcels can be considered as a "special circum-
stance." This ruling invites the type of arbitrary and capri-
cious action that should be guarded against, because the variance 
runs with the land. The. holding of the court below, if allowed 
to stand, would result ··.in the anomolous position that the Board 
of Adjustment could grant varian~es to individuals it felt demon-
strated sympathetic personal circumstances. 
Of course, just the converse is the rule. If the property 
is susceptible of productive use, the desires of the particular 
owner cannot be considered. The rule is that "[A] variance per-
tains to the property, not to the owner." Stice v. Gribben Allen 
Motors, Inc., 216 Kan. 744, 534 P.2d 1267, 1272 (1975). 17 
·The Board, therefore, submits that the court below improper-
ly found "unusual·· c i rcurns tances", based on facts .. which; under a 
proper reading of the s ta tu te, 'must not be considered at all. ' 
Fur thermo re, there J.9 no evidence in the record that the topo-
graphy of this parcel is unique in any way. I·n fact, what evi-
dence there is supports the view that this parcel is completely 
ordinary. Therefore, it was error for the court to compel the 
granting of the variance. 
2. Unnecessary Hardship. 
17see also: Anderson, supra, _§18.30; City and Borou~h of Juneau, 
595 P.2d 626, (Alaska, 1979); Lovell v. Planning Cornn, 37 
Or.App. 3, 586 P.2d 99 (1978). 
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The "unnecessary hardship" requirement of the law has 
evolved into a principle limiting the power of boards of adjust-
ment to grant variances. Similar language appears in the stat-
utes of nearly all of the states. 18 Even though this is a nebu-
lous term, the courts have, historically, been quick to vest the 
term with content so as to protect comprehensive zoning plans. 
The most widely-accepted definition of unnecessary hardship 
is found in the landmark case of Otto v. Steinhilber, a New York 
court of appeals case dating to 1939. The court said: 
"Before the board may exercise its discretion and grant 
a variance upon the ground of unnecessary hardship, the 
record must show that (1) the land in question canno~ 
yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose 
allowed in that zone: (2) that the plight of the owner 
is due to unique circumstances and not to the general 
conditions in the neighborhood which ma reflect the 
unreasona leness of t e zonin ordinance itse f: and 
( that the use to be authorized by t e variance will 
not alter the essential character of the locality." 
282~N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d~s1~(195911 reh. den. 2a2~N.Y. 
681, 26 N.E.2d 811 (Emphasis added). 
Although other courts have slightly altered this standard, it 
remains the classic definition of unnecessary hardship. 19 
The question, then, is whether or not the court's findings 
regarding unnecessary hardship are in harmony with the great 
weight of authority on this point. The findings of the court 
indicate that the hardships it considered were: 
18Anderson, American Law Zoning 2d Ed. §18.09. 
19Anderson, Id. §18.16. 
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"10. There is in Salt Lake City a shortage of low 
income housing and the elimination of this dwelling 
which provides low cost housing is inconsistent with 
the public need and interest. 
"11. Elimination of this unit would cause a hardship 
to a tenant ,who would be depi:.i ved of a habitable 
dwelling at' a relatively low cost of $150.00 per month • 
. "12. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic 
hardship for the plaintif.f in this action by, ipiposing 
an unnecessary loss· of $150.00 per month.• (App.Ex.5) 
These hardships fall into two categories: (1) an economic hard-
ship upon the owner due to the loss of rental income (finding no. 
12)1 (2) hardship upon the community generally and a tenant spe-
cifically in the loss of housing (findings nos. 10 and 11). In 
addition, Finding of Fact No. 21(c) implies that a hardship upon 
the Respondent existed because he was not informed of the non-
conforming nature of his plans soon enough to change them. 
(a) Economic Hardship Upon the Owner. This Court in 1939, 
ruling on the predecessor statute··to Section 10-9-12(3), indi-
ca ted -that: an economic benefit to -the owner is not a sufficient 
reason to compel the granting of a variance. It noted that any 
person could argue that if he were granted a variance he could 
make a more profitable use of his land. Walton v. Tracy Loan & 
Trust Co., 97 u. 249, 92 P.2d 724, 728 (1939). Case law across 
the country uniformly upholds this view. 
As Anderson points out, since a variance runs with the land, 
and not the owner, "[i]t follows that ••• hardship which is 
merely personal to the current owner of real property will not 
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justify the granting of a variance.• American Law of Zoning, 
2d.Ed. §18.30. As the Arizona court has correctly noted, neither 
the board, nor the court upon review, can be governed by finan-
cial considerations alone; rather: "'They are bound to take a 
broader view than the apparent monetary distress of the owner.' 
(citation omitted)" Ivancovich v. City of Tuscon Board of 
Adjustment, supra, 529 P.2d at 249. "The universal rule is that 
'the financial loss or the potential of financial advantage to 
the applicant is not the proper basis for a variance'." Stice v. 
Gribben Allen Motors, Inc., Parsons, supra, 534 P.2d 1272 and 
numerous cases cited therein. 
The position taken by the Lower Court would soon riddle the 
uniform zoning plan with personal economic variances. As Justice 
Tobriner in writing for the California Supreme Court, has recog-
nized: 
"In a word, 'profit motive is not and (sic) adequate 
ground for a variance.' (citations omitted) ••• If 
conditions which merely reduce profit margin were 
deemed sufficiently 'exceptional' to warrant relief 
from the zoning laws, then all but the least imagina-
tive developers could obtain a variety of variances, 
and the 'public interest in the enforcement of a com-
prehensive zoning plan' (citation omitted) would 
inevitably yield to the private interest in the maximi-
zation of profits." Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Ass'n. 
v. Board of Permit Appeals of city and County of San 
Francisco, 59 Cal.Rptr 146, 427 P.2d 810, 815 (1967) 
(Emphasis added). 
Of course, as the court went on to note, any hardship can ulti-
mately be put into economic terms. But the point is that the 
"unnecessary hardship" requirement is not met by a showing of a 
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loss of rental income. 
The facts clearly indicate there is no sufficient hardship 
in this case to justify the variance requested. There are eight 
rental units now on the property that are producing income. Just 
because their income is less than,·the Respondent wishes and the 
extra rental unit's income cushions his margin is insufficient 
basis for a finding of unnecessary hardship to sustain a vari-
ance. 
(b) Hardship Upon the Community in General. The conclusion 
of the court below was that a shortage of low income housing 
exists in Salt Lake City. There was no evidence presented by 
Respondent and only generalized statements of City zoning offi-
cials,. on questioning·' by the court, that no city has enough low 
income housing. B·a-sed·· on those sta·tements, the court held that 
to deny ~the variance would -.create.;.a hardship- upon the.community 
and tenant, since a·dweilinglwould· be~lost; ·This assumption by 
- the court falls far short of: the hardship .contemplated by Section 
10-9-12(3). 
The statute, itself, compels consideration of only those 
hardships which are upon the applicant. Subsection 3(a) reads: 
"· •• the imposition of which [hardship] upon the petitioner is 
unnecessary •••• " There is no indication that the board or the 
reviewing court should consider other generalized or perceived 
interests. 
zoning administrative authorities are properly concerned 
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with advancing the intent and purpose of legislation, not in 
subs ti tu ting their_ own personal policy ~for .the legislation. ··The 
variance power must, therefore, be strictly construed; otherwise, 
the Board and the reviewing court will be making forays into 
public policy areas set-aside for elected legislative bodies. If 
zoning ordinances are felt by the board or the court to conflict 
with community welfare, then the proper remedy lies in amending 
the ordinance, not in the granting variances. 20 
Furthermore, testimony in the record indicates that the well 
considered policy of the City is contrary to the finding of the 
court. Mr. Allen Johnson, Deputy Director of Advanced Planning 
for Salt Lake City testified: 
nThe witness: ••• We are committed, I think, as a 
moral obligation in the planning department in this 
city to not only increase the numbers of low income 
housing, but the quality of the .life style that is 
afforded or that is available to that low income tenant 
or individual. So it's a two pronged.attack, one of 
quantity and one of· quality. We- are. spending our _ 
limited resources as a city to do both of these things 
as best we can while at the same time doing other 
things. • • • 
nThe court: Do you recognize that there is a shortage 
of housing in Salt Lake? 
nThe witness: There is a shortage in every city of 
quality low income housing. 
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"Q. (By Ms. Lever) Have you ever received a directive, 
though, that even though there is a need for housing, 
that that has priority to allow or to encourage the 
existence of or the construction of buildings that are 
substandard as applied to the zoning standards? 
"A •. - No. We ·have not received a direct order or the 
.. City does not have a pol icy that allows for the con-
. struction of substandard buildings at the expense of 
· the zonin ordinance that uarantees those ameni-
ties. (R- 0 -05 (Emp as1s added). 
All indications are that the court below overstepped its bounds 
in considering.community· interests as a hardship under §10-9-
12 ( 3). 21 
The case law.0 -is in de.finite. accord.~ A Massachusetts court 
faced the argument that denial of a variance for apartment build-
ings created a cognizable hardship. The court said: 
"The most obvious deficiency. in the board's decision is 
the lack of a finding of 'conditions especially affect-
ing such parcel • • • but not affecting generally the 
zoning .. district in which it is located,' such that 
'substantial -hardship; ~--financial -or otherwise to the-
appellant' is invo,lved. Indeed, the board's only find-
ing of .a hardship·. is 'that - ha1rdship -ex is ts in that 
there. is a shortage of housing uni ts for large 
fami1ies.' This is obviousty~not a 'hardship, finan-
cial or otherwise to the appellant' seek~ng a variance 
before the board, in this case the developer of the · 
parcel." Cass v. Board of Appeal of Fall River, 317 
N. E. 2d 77, 79 (Mass .App. 197'4). (Emphasis added). 
The California courts agree, stating: 
"The claim that the development would probably serve 
21 The result in this case demonstrates the problems with a de 
novo type review as contemplated by the court below, i.e., courts 
must become enmeshed in public policy questions more properly 
left to the legislative -body. This court warned of such a result 
in the Walton case, supra, 92 P.2d at 727. 
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various community needs may be highly desirable, but it 
too does not bear on the issue at hand [that of hard-
ship]. 0 Topanga Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 113 
Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12, 21 (Cal. 1974); accord, 
Broadway, supra, 427 P.2d at 817. 
In sum, the court erred by: (1) weighing the enforcement of 
the zoning ordinances against the need for low income housing 
which is a function more properly reserved to the legislative 
body; and (2) by considering a hardship upon the community as a 
hardship under Section 10-9-12(3), which instead should be 
focused on the hardships of the variance applicant. 
(c) Hardship Due to City's Failure to Warn. As evidenced 
by Finding of Fact Nos. 21(c), and 15-19 the court held that the 
City had a duty to inform Mr. Xanthos of errors in his plans. 
The failure of the City to warn him early enough to allow him to 
change his plans resulted in a hardship which should now, accord-
ing to the Court, justify a variance. In essence, the courtheld 
that the City should be -es topped to enforce the_ zoning ordinances 
because of their supposed failure to 0 catch" the non-complying 
building during plan review or construction. 
This holding is in error for at least two reasons: (1) The 
law in this state is that a municipality cannot be estopped from 
enforcing its zoning ordinances, even though its officials may 
have mislead a citizen into believing that he could erect a non-
complying structure; and (2) the particular facts of this case 
are not sufficiently compelling to warrant the 9ranting of an 
estoppel. 
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This case should be governed by Dansie v. Murray City, 560 
P.2d 1123 (Ut., 1977). The operative facts are similar and, even 
though in that case substantial good faith cash investments would 
be wasted if the ordinance was enforced, this Court held the city 
was not estoppe.d,. Sinc.e. in this case the building in question 
can still be put to: beneficial use, even if the ordinance is 
enforced; a similar holding is required here. 
Second, even assuming that an estoppel might be imposed 
against a city, when acting in a governmental capacity because of 
the unauthorized acts of its officials; the facts of this case 
would not compel _such a result. Even when all the underlying 
facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the him, the 
Respondent does not qualify to benefit by estoppel. Basic rules 
concerning the granting of an estoppel state: 
,·_.. ". • • [A] party may .not properly base a claim_ of 
·,·,., es toppel in his favor on his own wrongful act or 
.:'derelection of duty; or, fraud committed or -participated 
-·in by him, or·:·on acts or omis·sions induced by his own 
conduct, concealment, or representations •••• One who 
claims a 'benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he 
has been mislead by the representations of another must 
not have been mislead through his own want of reason:-
able care and circumspection. A lack of diligence by a 
party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. 11 28 
Am.Jur.2d 719-722, Estoppel and Waiver, §79-80 
(Emphasis added). 
The undisputed facts of the case ;indicate .. that ·the failure of the 
City to warn Mr. James Xanthos ·Of the non-complying nature of his 
plan was based, at least, in part on the inaction of Mr. Xanthos 
or his agents and the deceptiveness or incompleteness· of the 
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plans that were submitted. 
First of all, it is undisputed that the plans and applica-
tions that were submitted to the City for review were at least, 
inconsistent and inaccurate. 22 The plot plan, instead of showing 
a dwelling, showed only an "existing building." The application 
for a building permit was improperly filled out; where it asked 
for "previously used land or structure", Mr. Xanthos or his agent 
put "vacant". Also, on the line which read "Dwelling uni ts now 
on lot:", "O" appears. Additionally, the blank under "accessory 
bldgs. now on lot" was left blank. 
On examination, both Mr. Blair and Mr. Hafey testified that 
if the application had indicated a dwelling on the premises, 
permits for the duplexes would not have been issued (R-225-26, 
255-56). However, opposing counsel argued and the court held 
tha tc these- ambiguities made_ it incumbent upon :the City _to _either 
investigate further or be estopped ~to:deny a variance. 
Indeed, this is the penultimate decision: who should bear 
the burden of an incomplete and/or deceptive application for a 
building permit? Should it be on the applicant and representor 
or upon the City? If the law required the City to "investigate 
or be estopped" upon the discovery of some ambiguity, Utah cities 
would be required to play cat and mouse with every person that 
~2Findings ,of Fact Nos. 15, 19; see App.Ex. 1 and 2 for the plan 
and application. 
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applied for a building permit. Such a rule would encourage or 
reward deception, inaccuracy, incompleteness and elusiveness upon 
the part of all applicants for permits. 
In other words, such a rule encourages one to submit ambigu-
ous plans that, appear to comply 1 but build as you want. It would 
create enormous incentive to corrupt inspectors and more tax 
dollars would go to hypercritical inspection.· People ·would be 
encouraged to hide facts from the City off icia1s, in hopes that · 
they might be able to proceed undetected to a point that their 
change in position would operate to es top the City from enforcing 
the ordinance. The comprehensive zoning plan would soon be 
lost. This result is clearly inimical to public policy. 
Rather, the law is and must be that the applicant for a 
building permit who fails· to completely divulge his circumstances 
must bear the risk the City may later find violations that would 
warrant the stoppage of: construction. Case law from other juris-
dictio~~ considering this issue so hold. In City of Chicago v. 
Zellers a building permit had wrongfully been.issued and, there-
after, revoked by the city. The plaintiff argued that the city 
should be estopped from enforcing the ordinance and stopping the 
construction, since the permit had been issued. However, the 
court found that the permit had been issued partly as a result of 
ambiguous plans and, therefore, found that even though those 
plans had been submitted, checked and approved by various divi-
sions of the building department, that they were deceptive on 
-39-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their face. The court thus held that estoppel would be improper 
against the city. 64 Ill.App.2d 24, 212 .N.E.2d 737, 739-40 
{Ill.App. 1965). An Oklahoma case dealt with a similar subject, 
and that court said: 
"To allow a property owner to circumvent, or obtain an 
· exception to, zoning ordinances by putting himself in a 
position {through his own acts and those of his agent 
or servant} wherein that enforcement would have a 
harsh, or detrimental, affect on him would practically 
emasculate such ordinances and make of their attempted 
enforcement a mere mockery." In re Pierce's Appeal, 
347 P.2d 790, 793, {Okla. 1959). 
The facts of this case indicate that this would be an 
improper case to apply estoppel. The Lower Court's finding that 
implicitly imposes such an estoppel was grievous error. Rather, 
the law must remain that the applying property owner must bear 
the risk of his own agent's carelessness or intentionally mis-
leading representations. 
3. Deprivation of Subs tan ti al Property Rights 
The statutory language in Subsection 3{c) provides that the 
property covered by the application must be deprived of 
privileges possessed by other properties in the same district 
because of special circumstances, before a variance can be 
awarded. It has been shown above that there are no special cir-
cumstances that affect this property; thus, there can be no cog-
nizable deprivation of substantial property rights. 
Furthermore, it is Appellant~Board's contention that the 
granting of this variance in essence confers a speciai privilege 
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upon the Respondent. Rather than insuring that this property 
shall enjoy the same rights enjoyed by other parcels of property 
in the district, the variance instead grants it and its owner a 
special privilege, not available to and in derogation.of the 
rights of others.' The· caseo.: law has recognized that .. J:h is 
undesirable 'result is possible and should be avoi"ded by refusing· 
to grant variances, except for those exceptional topog~aphical 
circumstances which act in conjunction with zoning ordinances to 
deny the property owner any beneficial use of his property. For 
example, the Alas·ka Supreme Court has pointed out: 
"The assertion that the ordinance merely deprives the 
landowner of a more profitable operation where the 
premises have substantially the same value for permit-
ted uses as other properly within the zoning classifi-
cation argues, in effect, for the grant of a special 
privilege to the selected landowner." City and Borough 
of Juneau v. Thibodeau:, ·595 P.2d 626, 635 (Ala., 1979) 
accord~ To an ~ Assoc. v~ Count of Los An eles, supra 
~t 22_# 2 C. R'at kopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
.45.3 ~t 45-8 (3rd Ed~ 1972). 
The converse of this principle would result in invidious 
distinctions. Coronet Homes, Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219, 225 
(Nev., 1968). Furthermore·, to· allow :an applicant a variance on 
such a basis would result, in effect, to· a spot zoning change1 
this act is, of course, proscribed. Thurman v. City of Mission, 
520 P.2d 1277, 1278, (Kan 1974), Erickson v. City of Portland, 
496 P.2d 726, 727 (Or. App. 1972). 
The most rational reading, therefore, of the deprivation o·f 
substantial property-rights language in the statute requires that 
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the applicant show that, under the zoning ordinances, his land 
cannot be put to any reasonable use. Here, the parcel is being 
put to valuable use. The building in question can be used, with-
out even considering the land's use and value in relationship to 
the four duplexes as open space, playground areas or other uses, 
if removed, as an accessory building without violating the 
ordinances. Significantly, no property owner in the vicinity has 
any greater rights or similar privilege. Therefore, no claim has 
been made that satisfies the requirements of the statute; to 
gr_ant the variance would result in the conferring of a special 
privilege, which is contrary to the spirit of the ordinance and 
the constitution as well. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT GRANTING 
OF THE VARIANCE WOULD NOT BE CONTRARY TO THE 
SPIRIT, OF THE ORDINANCE AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST; IT· IGNORED-.THE RECORD ~S SUPPORT .. FOR _ 
THE BOARD'S DECISION. 
Even if Respondent had met all of his·burden as described in 
Point II, this Court has ruled that: "the spirit of the ordinance 
must be observed, that is, no variance may be granted which is 
not in harmony with the purpose, object, policy, intent and plan 
of the City as manifested in the zoning and building ordi-
nances." Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., supra at 727. The 
District Court, in its amended findings of fact, found that these 
requirements had been met: 
"5. The continued existence of the dwelling, does not 
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violate any safety requirements, nor does it impair 
access, nor does it adversely affect the health, safety 
or morals of the citizens of Salt Lake City. 
. . . 
"20. (a) The variance in this case is not contrary to 
the public interest •••• (c) In light of the fact that 
the spirit of the ordinance has been observed and there 
has been substantial justice done. 
-"22. The imposition of the strict enforcement of the 
zoning ordinances upon the petitioner is unnecessary in 
order to carry out the general purpose of .the zoning 
plan and comprehensive plan in the city." 
The Board con~ends that these findings are purely form, being 
unsupported 'by wha-t evidence there is in the record; rather, the 
spirit and pu.rpose- of the plan have been ignored and not 
observed. 
The result of the Lower Court's decision underscores the 
importance of what one court 'Said, when faced with a similar 
problem:: 
"The:' days are fast- disappearing when the judiciary can 
look'at·a zoning ordinance· and-, with nearly as much 
confidence as a professional zoning expert, decide upon 
the merits of a zoning plan and its con tr ibu tion to the 
heal th1 safety, morals O'r general welfare of the com-
munity. Courts are becoming increasingly aware that 
they are neither super boards of adjust:Jnent nor plan-
ning commissions of the last resort." Coronet Homes, 
Inc. v. McKenzie, 439 P.2d 219 (Nev.,_ 1968) (.Emphasis 
added). 
Undoubtedly, the Court below felt that granting this one 
isolated variance would be so harmless as to pass unnoticed. But 
this nearsighted attitude fails to visualize the larger issue. 
One authority notes: 
t 
"Granting a variance for reasons other than extreme 
hardship may seem innocuous in its present impact on 
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the immediate neighborhood. However, 'long range plan-
ning may show that this will result in a flood of such 
demands, or be inconsistent with the desirable alloca-
tion of land uses ••• or hinder the proposed future 
evolution of the area into a fine residential one.' 
Thus, improper variances not only threaten neighborhood 
integrity and undercut the protective purposes of zon-
ing, but they also challenge the objectives of compre-
hensive urban planning." Shapiro, The Zoning Variance 
Power - Constructive in Theor , Destructive in 
Practice, 9 Md. L. Rev. 3, 10 (19 9). (Emphasis 
added). 
Indeed, unless the variance process is closely guarded, it can be 
destructive of the comprehensive zoning plan meant to benefit the 
public. The zoning authorities and the courts have a duty to be 
farsighted in protecting the general public's interests from 
selfish individual interests. As the Pennsylvania court has 
said: 
"While a change ••• seems both small and innocent, it 
might be neither when regarded as a trend: and it is 
with trends almost more than with individual monstrosi-
ties that the zoning authorities are concerned." 
Heller v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 171 A.2d 44, 46 
(Penn., 1961). 
The tenor of Section 10-9-12(3) is not to the contrary. The 
court below erred in having little regard for the C!ty's compre-
hensive zoning plan; its decision has adversely affected the 
zoning plan, in violation of the statute, in at least the follow-
ing ways: 
1. Parity. As discussed above, every landowner has an 
interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning plan. Each 
time a variance is granted, without a showing of extremely 
unusual conditions, the law abiding landowners in the vicinity 
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suffer. 
Ideally, "'each landownerc-gives up a part of his. freedom -to 
use his land in order to comply with zoning laws which are legis-
-· lated to deliver the greatest good to the greatest number in the 
comrnuni ty. ''That law-abidin:g citize-n is all too often cheated by 
a liberal variance policy that allows his neighbors to evade the 
ordinances. Coronet Hornes, Inc., supra, at 224. The plan thus 
falls '.into disrepute. Topanga Ass'n., supra, at 19. Thus, the 
idea that an isolated variance ·g·rant won't really harm -the plan 
"significantly" is erroneous. 
A liberal variance policy would· lead to: ( 1) a flood of 
applications for variances; and (2) disrespect for and an even-
tual disintegration ·of· the comprehensive zon-ing plan. · Therefore, 
it is not - in the public interest to allow such variances ind is---· 
crirnina tly. 
Oh the other hand, if a landowner can make .a· stiff icient .: 1 
showing of'' "unique"' and' "special conditions" that attach to his 
prop~rty, then parity could be maintained, even though a variance 
is granted. The uniqueness of the property- warrants unique 
treatment. It is this high s·tandard and overall perspective that 
the Board uniquely must administer in implementing the spirit of 
the ordinance. 
2. - Protection. Mr. Allen Johnson testified that yard size 
ordinances are d~signed to protect renters and owners from inva-
sions of privacy, as well as from other dangers. Also, the· ordi-
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• 
nances guarantee that renters will have an acceptable yard area, 
something that• is lacking here. He states: 
n • specifically with respect to the yard area the 
building, the zoning ordinance provides open space 
around a structure which affords the occupant the pri-
vilege of enjoying the outdoors, of doing those things 
around your house that you would normally do around the 
·house, like hanging your wash out, letting your kids 
play outside, having an area guaranteed for that pur-
pose so that it isn't obstructed or interferred with 
with somebody else. They are not going to have a car-
port or a wading pool for instance. The availability 
of some assurance that someone walking down the alley 
isn't going to look right into your bedroom or bathroom 
window, as just a common occurrence walking down the 
alley, and the separation from the house to the side-
yard property, or the front property line to the street 
or the house excuse me. The yard area also, and 
especially the rear yard, afford the occupant the space 
to do those things that might be necessary to support 
the use of his home, where he can store materials that 
you wouldn't want to have in the front yard, including 
your garbage. Or you can maybe put a workshop or a 
garage or a carport or a patio and be assured of some 
privacy from the neighbors." (R-394A-395) 
Consequently, the-cour~'s finding~that,the continued~use~f-
the building as a dwelling did not-impair-access by-fire or 
police agents, etc. does not fully address the objective and 
goals of yard area requirements. Furthermore, the importance of 
adequate side and rear yards has been recognized by this Court in 
Hargreaves v. Young, 3 U.2d 175, 280 P.2d 974 (Utah, 1955). 
3. Accessibility. The small building in question lacks the 
required frontage on a dedicated street. This was not addressed 
by the court's findings, although Mr. Johnson did testify that 
this zoning requirement is extremely important to the comprehen-
sive zoning plan: 
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"Q. [By Ms. Lever] The requirement of frontage on 
dedicated streets,_does that have impact or any direct 
relationship in terms of the planning purposes and 
objectives related to providing services for that 
building? Public services? 
"A. [By Mr. Johnson] ••• So frontage provides a 
person with, first, a direct accessibility to public 
utilities underground, or in this case maybe.some power 
poles and things like this. It also is very, keyed 
toward dispatch of emergency services •••• So that if 
an emergency. vehicle was dispatched to that address, we 
would have: a difficult time finding the·building, which 
is central to a key concern of ours. One of the major 
objectives in the fire department is .a reduction in 
response time necessary, and the City is judged by our 
ability to respond quickly to fires. The insurance 
rates that applies on all the residences of Salt Lake 
City is based upon that very fac .. tor, along with the 
type of equipment we have and. how fast we can get that 
equipment in the field and' .respond to emergency situa-
tions. The frontage also provides the property owner 
with a place where he can take his trash out, .. his gar-
bage out and set it up there. He doesn't have to worry 
about carrying/"it out and ·putting -it up in, .. front of 
somebody else's house and walking down somewhere else 
on the sidewalk to deposit his trash on the street." 
(R-396-97) 
The only evldence in the record supports the view that 
frontage upon a dedicated street is, indeed, an important aspect 
of the zoning ordinance which underpins the Board's decision. To 
allow a variance which encourages the use of a nonconforming 
structure, without the required -frontage would .be contrary to the 
spirit and a major objective of the ordinance. 
4. Stabilization of Neighborhoods. Mr• Johnson testified 
as to the importance of comprehensive zoning, as it impacts upon 
developing neighborhoods: 
"Q. [By Ms. Lever] Now, are there objectives that are 
contained with in the master plan that deal with 
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attempting to stabilize existing developed neighbor-
hoods? 
"A. Yes. That's one of our mandates at the moment, is 
the preservation of a residential area and the enhance-
ment of those residential areas. The programs and 
policies that we are using right now, and of course the 
zoning ordinance through its nonconforming provisions, 
assist the City in removing buildings, or encouraging 
·the removal of buildings that do not conform to today's 
standards.a (R-402) 
This is another area that the court failed to address in its 
finding that the variance requested would not affect the public 
health, safety or welfare. The testimony of the zoning officials 
charged with planning for that very welfare indicates that the 
opposite is true. 
Other negative impacts of the variance, which were discussed 
by Mr. Johnson but seem to have been ignored by the court, are: 
(1) garbage collection (R-394, 398, 401); (2) density re9uire-
ments (R-395-also 311-312); ,and {3)_parking _(R-408-409). _The 
listing could continue, but the point is ___ that the court, in its--
zeal to focus on one citizen, refused to recognize the public 
interest as required by statute. As Mr. Johnson testified: 
"Q. In your opinion, is there any harm done to the 
master plan if this building is allowed and authorized 
and legalized for dwelling purposes? 
"A. Wel 1, it runs contrary to the whole goal of the 
City's planning effort. One, the stabilization 
enhancement of the residential areas. Carries with it 
all those negative characterizations that we are trying 
to eliminate. The zoning ordinances of course are to 
be equally administered, and .I think that in this case 
if the -position was that this building would remain 
(sic) (as) a City decision, then we should rethink that 
overall goal for Salt Lake City and think in terms of 
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not so much enhancement, but just strictly numbers of 
rental dwelling units. 
"Q. Is that contrary to the legislative mandate and 
policies • • • as you understand them to be imple-
mented? 
. . . 
"A. Yes, it is." (R-408-409) 
· It is respectfully submitted that the record abundantly 
supports the Board's denial of the variance. This is true 
whether viewed from the facts before the Board or those presented 
de novo to the Court. The Lower Court erred in not affirming the 
denial. It was a request unsupported by facts to demonstrate an 
extremely unique special circumstance, or where strict zoning 
enforcement would work an unreasonable hardship when balanced 
against the public interest. 
:':i.' 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks a reversal from this Court of the error of 
the Lower Court in°conducting a trial de·novo-when,reviewing a 
decision of the Board of Adjustment. As a matter of law such 
litigation must be reviewed by the courts in their l}.mited 
appellate·~ jurisdiction merely to determine if the administrative 
body did not abuse its discretion which is presumed valid. 
Courts are not free to substitute their judgment unless the 
evidence is devoid of reasonable support. 
In so doing, the District Court also erred by failing to 
afford the administrative decision with a presumption of validity 
and by assuming the prerogative to substitute( its judgment for 
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the Board's in reweighing and rebalancing the evidence before the 
Board. 
Inasmuch as the record clearly shows such reasonable support 
for the Board's decision, Respondent failed to meet its burden to 
show clear and convincing error, and therefore the Board's 
decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of August, 1982. 
--~~ 
JUDY F. LEVER 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
cc61 
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Rough Electrical 
Rough Plumbing 
Shower Pan Test 
Stucco Mah or Exterior Siding 
Sew.r f 
lnt1rceptor 
Septic Tank 
leach line or Seep Pit 
Back Flow and Cross Connection 
Water Service 
lath or Drywall Nailing 
Gas line Air Test 
Final Electrical 
Final Plumbina 
FNI Heatina A.C. 
J 
. 
-Final Construction 1-/~.Ytf ~-Ar~.£"'./,-
DO NOT CONCEAL UNTIL ABOVE ARE SIGNED AND DATED · 
, 
NOTE - ff work la not marked approved. make correc:OOna noted 
under remark• and call for another lnapectl\Jn before 
continuing work. Permit explrH by llmftatlon 120 daya from 
date of permit if conatructJon la not stened. ~ 
.... 
Ttnin~~r'~ ~iil~g IQ)c;; ~R~n1ru('l(oi BlriJ.F.1~ .. 1J~....,.,. ~.;ci;,u~, ; p1ace ori"1 
the ~··--·· 1s wilJ be ii 
NOTICE 
'I Approved Building plans are required on job site at time . 
of each and every inspection. 
ALSO NOTE , ~ 
No work of any kind. on any part of any building or , 
structure requiring inspection shall be covered or concealed 1• 
in any manner whatsoever. without first obtaining the J.·: 
approval of. the Building Official in writing. ~;'., 
r· 
REMARKS ,. I· 
. ) ··. 
/1i 
~ 
' 
' 
-
8uild4ng lnspeaar 
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'f.r' •• ~f:. APPENDIX 3 • r 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, SALT LAKE CITY; UTAH 
FINDINGS AND ORDER, CASE NO. 7928 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION: 
This is an appeal by Gary J. X~nthos for a variance to legalize a single-family 
dwelling at 1610 West 900 South Street on a lot with a newly constructed duplex 
which causes the dwelling to not have frontage on a dedicated street, without the 
required side and rear yards, and without the required off-street parking in a Resi-
dential "R-2" District. 
Gary Xanthos was present together.with Richard Rappaport of 66 Exchange Place. Also 
present was Nona T. Cottle of 1616 West .,900 South. Mr. Jorgensen explained that the 
single-family dwelling lo.cated on the rear p_ortion of the lot was evidently built 
some time prior to 1927 and may have been a garage originally situated right on the 
alley. If it was built prior .. to 1927 it was built before there was any zoning. In 
1974 a permit was taken out for four duplexes plus carports. The plans indicated an 
existing building on the lot but -it was not marked as a dwelling. In looking at the 
plans, it was assumed .. that. the building was an accessory building; but the building 
inspectors should have noted the problem when inspecting the property. It would be 
permissable to have an accessory building behind the duplexes but not a dwelling. 
If it would have been known that it was a dwelling the duplexes would never have · 
been permitted to be constructed in front of it. Every building has to face on a 
dedicated street. Even if a building is situated way in the back of the lot with 
room for another dwelling, one could not be constructed in front of it,because it 
would make either the building in the front illegal or the building in the rear il-
legal. Laura Landikusic presented the .original plans and permits which indicate no 
dwelling on the lot at that time. The applic,arif who· filed for the permit stated 
that the property was vacant. It was, also noted that the carports were not con-
structed in accordance with the. p]..ans the b.uiJ.,ding permit was issued on. The car-
ports were to be detached directly off the alley but they are attached with the 
rear area blacktopped instead "of landscaped. ,. Mr. Rappaport explained that James 
Xanthos was the owner of the property at the time of. const.ruction but is now de-
ceased. Mr. Rappaport stated that he understood that the building was a dwelling 
at the time the duplexes were constructed. He further stated that the dwelling pro-
vides low-income housing and is necessary for the economic feasibility of the duplex 
project. He further stated that he. doesn't know of any compla.ints. Mr. Rappaport 
.explained that if the·deceased had known of the violation at the time he applied for 
the permit he could have arranged a different plan but the property was:lnspected by 
various inspectors and nothing was said. Mr. Rappaport feels that at the time of 
construction there was no intention of violating the law; ·a proper perm~t was ob-
tained. 
Nona Cottle who owns the adjacent property stated that as far a.s she knows the house 
was occupied when the duplexes were constructed but Mr. Xantbos did put in some new 
wiring and put new siding on the house although he told her he wasn't supposed to. 
She explained that the house has no foundation under it and was built from the in-
side out. She is not in opposition so much to the .house being there but to the pre-
sent occupants. They bring in a lot of traffic and noise. The blacktopping of the 
alley leading to the house was also discussed. It was brought out.-t:hat there are -
many older homes in the City that don't have foundations but the house should be in-
spected for other violations. Mr. Xanthos .stated that the tenant in the house could 
be changed if that would make it more acceptable to Ms. Cottle. It was also noted 
by the Board that there are some junk cars by the house that should be removed. Mr. 
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Xanthos was informed that he is responsible for the tenants and so he is responsible 
for getting the cars removed •. Later in the meeting the various aspects of the case 
were reviewed. It was noted that certificates of occupancy were issued for the du-
plexes. The single-family dwelling has no rear yard and insufficient side yards. 
There is no record of a modified plan being filed for the alterations from the orig-
inal plans for the duplexes. These problems should have been caught when the du-
plexes were inspected. The violation was brought to the attention of Building· and 
Housing from another department in the City. The small house has to be either re-
moved or legalized. Al Blair explained that the building inspector usually doesn't 
look at the permit, he refers to the plot plan. The Board felt that some of the 
blacktop in the rear yard should be removed and landscaping installed. It was noted 
that the carports are legal although they are not built in the configuration indicated 
on the original plans. 
From the evidence before it and after further consideration, it is the opinion of 
the Board that the granting of the requested variance would be inimical to the best 
interest of the district and contrary to the spirit and intent of the Zoning Ordi-
nance since the Board could find no unusual condition attached to this property which 
would deprive the owner of a substantial property right or use of his property, since 
the building permit indicated that there were no dwellings on the property and since 
no evidence was presented which would justify the requested variance. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the requested variance be denied and the violations 
corrected within 30 days. 
Action taken by the Board of Adjustment at its meeting held Monday, February 26, 1979. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of March, 1979. 
/' 
,· _,· ,, . • ,·:--- ... i..... 
Vice Chairman 
. { ( , (_~(I' /. // . ~ / 
)feting Secretary · .. .J 
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10-9-12. Powers of board on appeal-Granting of and showing to be 
entitled to varia.nce.-The board of adjustment shall have· the following 
powers: 
(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is error 
in any orde~, requirement, decision or determination made by the admin-
istrative official in the enforcement of this article or of any ordinance 
adopted pursuant thereto. 
(2) To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance 
upon which such board is required to pass under such ordinance. 
(3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the 
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to 
special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance 
will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the-ordi-
. nance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Before any variance 
may be authorized, however, it shall be shown that: 
(a) The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive p1an 
of zoning in the city and that adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance · 
will cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of ·which upon the 
petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the 
plan. -
(b) Special circumstances attached to the property covered by the 
application which do not generally apply to the other property in the same 
distric~ · 
(c) That because of said special circumstances, property covered by 
application is deprived of privileges possessed by other properties in the . 
same district; and that the granting of the variance is essential to the 
enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by other property in 
the ~me distric~ 
: : 10-9-15. Judicial · review of board's decision-Time limitation.-The 
city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court 
of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented 
to the court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office 
of the board. 
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' CAPPENDIX 5 
ILED IN CLE;ll<'S OFFICE 
RI chard A. Rappapor""t-------F Ga1t Lake C::.unt1, Utch 
CXllNE, RAPPAPCmT ~ SEGAL 
88 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah ·1411t 
Telephones Uol) 531-2888 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FEB 101382 
IN 1HB DISTRlcr CX>ORT OF THB mtRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND PCB SALT LAKE OXJNTY, STATE OP Ul'AH 
• • • • • • • 
GARY J. XANTR>S, ) 
) AMENDED 
Plaintiff, ) FINDIN~ OP PACT ) AND 
YI. ) CDfCLUS 1005 OP LAW 
BOARD OP ADJUSTMBNT 
) 
) 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, ) Civil No. C-79-2426 
) 
Defendant. ) 
• • • • • • • 
The plaintiff having submitted Findings _of Pact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the defendant having filed objections t~ 
the same, and counsel for both parties having met with the 
Honorable Kenneth Rlgtrup, District Judge, on the 1st day or 
Pebruary, 1982, and the Court having determined to deny some of 
the objections end to grant others, 
M:>W, THBREPCllB, the Court makes the foll owl ng Amended 
Findings of Pact and Conclusions or Law. 
PINDIN~ OP PAf:r 
1. That tlie zoning ordinances of Salt Lake Cl ty were 
,adopted In September of 1921. 
2. Vern Jorgensen, Director of Planning and Zoning Depart-
'ment of, Salt Lake City, at the Board of Adjustments hearing 
stated that· the building had been there prior to 1927, the date 
of enactm"nt of Salt Lake ~lty zonl ng ordl nancea. 
reflected In the Board of Adjustment minutes. 
This Is 
s. The structure In question at 1810 West 900 South, SaJ t 
Lake City, Utah, was definitely In existence on April 21, 1942, 
and at that time It was occupted by a tenant and It had a 
weathered appearance and an appearance of. being an old bul ldlng. 
4. Since at least April 21, 1942 1 the building h~s been 
occupied and.used· aa a dwelling by a large number of tenants. 
110 
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5. The continued existence of the dwelling, does not 
violate any safetJ requirements, nor does It Impair access, nor 
does It adverselJ affect the health, safety or morals of thE 
citizens of Salt Lake City. 
8. That to comply with the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment and terms of the ordl nances, the bul ldl ng would have 
to be el ther removed or used as storage or other aux I 11 ary use 
requiring the elimination of Its use as a dwelling. Such removal 
or changes to comply with strict enforcement serve no pu~llc 
Interest In this case. 
7. The proposed solutions of removal or change In use woul< 
eliminate a dwelling which Is clearly habitable and which has an< 
Is being put to valuable use. 
I. The solutions of modifying the building to some 
accessory or aux I llary use or demo II tlon would result In nc 
Improvements or enhancement of safety requirements traffic 
circulation, air space, or the health, safety or morals of thE 
conmun I ty. 
9. The gross square footage of the property woul~ 
accomodate based upon minimum area requirements four duplexes an~ 
a single family dwelling If properly designed. However, the 
configuration •nd design on the subject property are not sc 
properly deal gned or arranged, and _there fore exceed the ml n I mun 
.!' 
requirements and lack yard areas required under ordinance. 
10. There Is In Salt Lake City a shortage of low lncomE 
housing and the elimination of this dwelling which provh!es lo• 
cost housing Is Inconsistent with the public need and Interest. 
11. Elimination of this unit would cause a hardship toe 
tenant who would be deprived of a habitable dwelling at e 
relatively low cost of $150.00 per month. 
12. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic hard-
ship for the plaintiff In this action by Imposing an unnecessar) 
loss of $150.00 per month. 
13. Continuation of the use as a ·dwelling In this case wllJ 
not substantially affect the comprehensive plan of Salt LakE 
2 
:!.1.1. 
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City. Whereas. strict enforcement wlll cause unnecessary hardship 
for tenant and owner, .without furthering the general plan. 
14. The granting of the variance Is essential to the pro-
perty owner to enjoy substantial property rights enjoyed by other 
property owners. 
15. The plat submitted as part of the original building 
&~plication for four duplexes by the plaintiff's deceased father, 
-James Xanthos, showed that there wa~ an existing building on the 
site. The application Indicated that there was no dwelling or 
the site. The application did not Indicate any accessory build· 
lngs on the site. 
16. The original plans filed by James Xanthos with thf 
Planning and Zoning Department 
There were other deficiencies 
cannot be found by the- Cl ty. 
In the City record keepln( 
pertaining to the building and Its occupancy. 
IT. City building Inspectors went to the site at least flv• 
times during the' course of construction. The structure was ob· 
servable to the Inspectors, and one of the city Inspectors 
Marvin Pegu 111!'-n, observed the building and I nqul red about It bu· 
none of the Inspectors followed through with removing th• 
building frcm use or availability for use as a dwelling. 
18. The City Issued certificates of occupancy for the fou 
duplexes. There_... was no evl dence or record of any .conmunl cate• 
conditions or stipulations restricting or concerning the use o 
removal of the structure as a single family dwelling. 
· 19. Although the application made no· reference to th 
aJngle family dwelling, the Inclusion of the building on the pla 
plan was sufficient disclosure by the applicant to place the Cit 
on reasonable notice to make further Jl'lqulry about the exlstenc 
and use of the building. 
20. The Board of Adjustment erred In fa 111 ng to grant 
variance In accordance with the provisions of 10-9-12(3) 
thats (a) the variance In this case Is not contrary to th 
public Interests (b) there are special condl tlons which wll 
result In unnecessary hardship 'If· there Is a 11 teral enforcemen 
3 
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of the provisions of the ordlnancei and (c) In light of the fac 
that the spirit of the ordinance has been observed and there ha 
been substantial justice done. 
21. There are special circumstances attached to th 
property covered by the application wh'lch do not generally appl 
to other properties In the same district Including, but no 
limited to1 (a) the age and occupancy of the dwelling; (b) th 
approval by the City of the development of the duplexes th· 
Issuance of certificates ~f occupancy for the duplexes1 and 
(c) the failure of the City to Inform James Xanthos that th• 
dwelling would not comply with zoning ordinances thereby falllnt 
to give him the opportunity to redesign the layout for t~ 
duplexes In such a way as not to require the demolition of th• 
dwelling. 
22. The Imposition of the strict enforcement of the zonlnf 
ordinances upon the petl ti oner Is unnecessary In order to carr! 
out the general purpose of the zoning plans and comprehenshf 
plan In the city. 
CXlNCLUSIONS OP LAW 
1. The Board of Adjustment wrongfully, arbitrarily, capri-
ciously and unreasonably fal led to grant the var lance requestec 
by the plalntl~f herein. 
2. The variance should have been granted pursuant to thE 
pr.ovlsl ons of Sec ti on 10-9-12(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended. 
3. The provisions of Section 10-9-15 provide that any 
person aggrieved of a decision of th' Board of Adjustment may 
maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom~ 
4. This court has jurisdiction with respect to such plenary 
action for relief. 
5 •. Plenary action relief constitutes a complete review of 
the Board of Adjustment's decision by trial de novo and the court 
bas the same power as the Board of Adjustments to review the 
facts. 
4 
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I. The Board of Adjustment's decision was contrary to t,.e 
evidence In the case and pla Intl ff la entl tied to the var I ance 
requested as a matter of law and equity. 
T. There ls no public Interest served In requiring the 
demolition of the subject building or Its conversion Into ar 
accessory building. 
11. The failure to grant the variance Is arbitrary, 
•/' 
capricious and unreasonable and contrary to the heal th, safet) 
and morals of Salt La1;\ City and Its citizens. 
DATED this I 1 -day of February, 1982. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correc 
copy of the foregoing Amended Findings of Pact and Conclusions o 
Law was malled, post~ge prepaid, on the ~~-(_b_ day of February 
1982, to Judy _P. Lever, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Cit 
and County Building, Salt Lake 
,. 
5 
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